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Why Originalism Is Consistent with
Natural Law: A Reply to Critics
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By J. JOEL ALICEA
May 3, 2022 6:30 AM

Some critics of originalism fault it on natural-law grounds.
Their critiques are wanting.

C

onstitutional theorists on the right are engaged in a debate about the moral foundations of
originalism, the theory that government officials, including judges, are bound by the original meaning
of the Constitution. I recently offered a defense of originalism’s moral authority grounded in the
natural-law tradition. Harvard law professor Adrian Vermeule and his sometime co-author, University
of Liverpool law professor Conor Casey, recently responded to my draft article, as did another supporter of
Vermeule’s theory, lawyer and blogger Pat Smith. In the interest of furthering this important discussion about
the moral foundations of originalism, I respectfully offer this reply.
***
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The background of this controversy can be briefly stated. Originalism has been the reigning constitutional theory
of legal conservatives since the election of Ronald Reagan, but in a March 2020 essay in the Atlantic, Vermeule
called on legal conservatives to “abandon[] the defensive crouch of originalism” and embrace “a substantive
moral constitutionalism that [is] not enslaved to the original meaning of the Constitution.” This alternative
theory, which Vermeule called “common good constitutionalism,” would “read into the majestic generalities and
ambiguities of the written Constitution” “substantive moral principles that conduce to the common good.”
Vermeule elaborated on his theory in his new book, Common Good Constitutionalism, in which he attempted to
ground his theory in the natural-law tradition.

Shortly after Vermeule published his book, I posted online a draft article (forthcoming in the Notre Dame Law
Review) that provides a natural-law justification for originalism and argues that Vermeule’s theory
misunderstands the implications of the natural-law tradition for American constitutionalism. I argue that, under
well-established natural-law principles, political authority — that is, the power to make and enforce laws and
resolve legal disputes — is essential to secure those conditions that allow for human beings to flourish, conditions
that we might call “the common good.” In the natural-law tradition, ultimate political authority is vested in the
people of a society, and part of that authority is the power to constitute a government. Within the broad
parameters of the natural law, the people have discretion in allocating authority within a regime to secure the
common good, which the American people did by ratifying the Constitution.
Because each of us has a moral obligation to pursue our own (and our community’s) flourishing, each of us has a
moral obligation to seek the common good, which means each of us has a moral obligation to preserve the
people’s legitimate political authority that is essential to securing the common good. Assuming that the
Constitution is, at least as a general matter (though perhaps not in all its applications), consistent with the
substance of the natural law, our obligation to preserve the people’s legitimate authority means respecting the
decisions the people have made in allocating power and constituting their government. In the American context,
the only way to preserve the people’s legitimate authority is to understand the Constitution as they understood it
when they ratified it. To allow present-day officials to depart from the original meaning of the Constitution is to
allow them to undermine the decisions made by the people in the exercise of their legitimate authority, and
undermining the people’s legitimate authority harms the common good. Thus, when Vermeule argues that judges
ought to depart from the original meaning of the Constitution in the name of the common good, he commits a
serious error, since judicial departure from the original meaning of the Constitution necessarily harms the
common good. There is, therefore, a moral obligation to obey the original meaning of the Constitution.
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2/9

7/1/22, 1:27 PM

U.S. Constitution: Originalism Consistent with Natural Law | National Review

***
As noted above, Vermeule and Casey responded in a blog post. The first and most significant thing to notice
about their response is that they do not dispute anything I said in my article. Rather, they argue that “Alicea has
said nothing that is even prima facie in tension with our interpretive arguments.” Vermeule and Casey’s
response, then, is not that I am wrong; it is that the conclusions I reach are unimportant (in Vermeule and
Casey’s words, my conclusions “are banalities, truisms”). In their view, my arguments are fully reconcilable with
common-good constitutionalism. As Vermeule and Casey elaborated in a subsequent article responding to Judge
William Pryor’s criticism of common-good constitutionalism: “Common good constitutionalism does not alter
the semantic meaning of concepts and principles,” and it does not “take the semantic meaning to be entirely open
to any and all changing applications and moral novelties that current generations may dream up.”[i] Commongood constitutionalism, according to Vermeule and Casey, does not oppose what they call “‘thin’ originalism,”
“the bare commitment to the claim that the meaning of a fixed text remains constant over time.”[ii]
This is genuine progress in the debate. In his Atlantic essay two years ago, Vermeule stated that the “common
core” of originalist theories “is the view that constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the Constitution’s
enactment,” and it was that “core” of all originalist theories that Vermeule said “has now outlived its utility” and
should be discarded. Today, Vermeule agrees that “the meaning of a fixed text” — including the Constitution —
“remains constant over time,” and he has clarified that he rejects only certain kinds of originalism. That is
consistent with his earlier retreat from a broad condemnation of all originalist theories in his Atlantic essay to a
recognition that “no global condemnation of ‘textualism’ is adequate.” Vermeule concedes that some forms of
textualism/originalism are based on the natural-law tradition, and his “disagreement with” those forms of
originalism is, he has said, “ultimately one of contingent judgement rather than of principle.” These clarifications
represent a welcome narrowing of the scope of Vermeule’s critique of originalism,[iii] since they make his claims
more precise and, therefore, allow for a more fruitful exchange.
More fundamentally, both sides now agree that the moral imperative to secure the common good means
preserving the people’s legitimate authority, and both sides now agree that preserving the people’s legitimate
authority means understanding the Constitution as the people understood it when they ratified it. Our continuing
disagreement, then, is about the implications of those premises. Vermeule thinks those premises pose no
difficulties for his theory; I think they do.
The principal (though not exclusive) focus of Vermeule’s theory is on how judges should decide cases, and our
shared premises have significant implications for the judicial role. If the moral imperative to secure the common
good means understanding the Constitution as the people understood it when they ratified it, then the scope of
judicial authority under the Constitution becomes a distinctively legal form of historical inquiry, since it is
through such an inquiry that we can recover how the people authoritatively allocated the power to resolve legal
disputes within the American constitutional system. Yet if there is one thing that Vermeule has been crystal-clear
about, it is that “officials (including, but by no means limited to, judges) should read into the majestic generalities
and ambiguities of the written Constitution” “substantive moral principles”[iv] regardless of whether judges
were historically understood to have the authority to do so under Article III of the Constitution. In Vermeule’s
words: “I certainly do not advocate a revival of the classical law because it is the original understanding.”[v] He
disclaims as “an ersatz form of respect for the natural law” the argument that judges may resort to the natural law
in adjudicating cases “only insofar as it happens to be picked up by an originalist command (a form of soft
positivism), not because it has binding force as natural law in its own right.”[vi] Thus, Vermeule simultaneously
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endorses two propositions: (1) the common good requires that we understand the scope of judicial power as the
people understood it when the Constitution was ratified, and (2) the scope of judicial power includes the power to
apply substantive moral principles in deciding cases regardless of whether the people understood the judicial
power that way when the Constitution was ratified.
This means that one of two things is true about Vermeule’s position. Either he has fallen into a flat contradiction,
or he believes that the natural law requires that judges must have the authority to resort to substantive moral
principles in adjudicating constitutional disputes, regardless of whether the people may have decided otherwise.
If the latter position were true, historical inquiry would indeed be irrelevant; it would not matter what the people
had decided about the scope of judicial power, since the people could not legitimately decide something contrary
to the natural law. The problem with this latter view is that Vermeule never offers an argument in its favor. It is
simply assumed throughout his book, blog posts, and other writings on this subject, even though many naturallaw theorists, such as Professor Robert P. George, have argued against it.[vii] It is also undermined by his
repeated acknowledgement in his book that “the precise allocation of law-interpreting power between courts and
other public bodies is itself a question for determination,”[viii] where “determination” is a process in which
decisions are, by definition, not dictated by the natural law. I point all of this out in my Notre Dame Law Review
article,[ix] and it demonstrates that Vermeule’s theory is either self-contradictory or rests on an undefended
premise that he himself gives us reason to reject. Yet Vermeule does not respond to these arguments.
Instead, Vermeule argues in his response that the real debate is “about the limited determinacy of the positive
law,” that is, “what to do in hard cases, where the putatively fixed meaning is vague, ambiguous, or conflicts with
other equally legitimate sources of law, such that interpreters are necessarily left with interpretive discretion at
the point of application.” In Vermeule’s view, it is “impossible to avoid interpretation that rests on controversial
normative judgments at the point of application, especially in hard cases.”[x] About this issue, his response
asserts that I “say[] almost nothing.”
I do, in fact, expressly address in my article Vermeule’s argument that moral principles must be brought to bear
in cases of under-determined text, and what I say is based on the foregoing analysis: resolving underdeterminacy is primarily a historical inquiry.[xi] The key point, again, is that we are trying to recover the people’s
original understanding of the Constitution. If, at the time of ratification, the people would not have understood
the Constitution in light of the kinds of substantive moral principles Vermeule would have judges employ, then
he would not be trying to understand the Constitution as they did; he would be substituting his understanding for
theirs. And because that undermines the people’s legitimate authority, it imperils the common good. Thus, my
argument shows that, with respect to under-determined texts, Vermeule’s resort to substantive moral principles
irrespective of their historical grounding is mistaken.
Perhaps the people did understand the Constitution against a backdrop of the kinds of substantive moral
principles to which Vermeule appeals. Vermeule points to an ostensible history of the Founders relying on
natural-law arguments in interpreting the Constitution (even while Vermeule disclaims the necessity of that
history to his theory).[xii] But the point is that whether those moral principles are part of the people’s original
understanding is a historical question, not one dictated by the natural law.
There are, after all, other ways to resolve under-determinacy without directly applying substantive moral
principles. There are numerous principles of interpretation that were well-established at the Founding and that
help resolve ambiguity or vagueness when it arises, such as many of those that Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner
https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/05/why-originalism-is-consistent-with-natural-law-a-reply-to-critics/
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surveyed in their book Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. Those principles, along with historical
analysis, will resolve a great deal of apparent under-determinacy. It is erroneous to simply assume that a text
that looks under-determined is, in fact, incapable of clarification through further historical analysis and
application of traditional interpretive principles. Vermeule, for instance, cites in his response “the equal
protection of the laws” as an example of under-determined texts, but this ignores the impressive scholarship of
Professors John Harrison and Christopher Green arguing that the “protection of the laws” was actually a fairly
well-understood phrase in 1868, not some amorphous, abstract guarantee of equality that always calls for moral
analysis at the point of application to a particular case.[xiii] As Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport
have argued, skipping straight from seemingly abstract language to the conclusion that the language is underdetermined is to commit the “abstract meaning fallacy.” Certainly, nothing in the natural-law tradition requires
committing that fallacy, and Vermeule offers no argument otherwise.
The abstract-meaning error is related to another fallacy: the fallacy of the excluded middle. In his book,
Vermeule, relying on the work of the important non-originalist theorist, Ronald Dworkin, sets up a choice
between two different ostensibly originalist approaches. Under the first approach, the original meaning refers
only to “the principles embodied in semantic content,” such that those living today (such as judges) would apply
“the abstract principle” of cruelty embodied in the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause based on their best
understanding of what that principle objectively requires.[xiv] Under the second approach, “[original] meaning is
based on expected applications,” such that the clause refers not to some abstract principle but to “a particular set
of punishments” that those who ratified the Eighth Amendment would have regarded as “cruel.”[xv] Vermeule,
following Dworkin, thinks that there is no principled way for originalists to decide between these two
alternatives, which exacerbates the under-determinacy problem.[xvi]
But as Professor Lawrence Solum has argued at length, Dworkin’s (and, therefore, Vermeule’s) argument
presents a false choice that excludes an intermediate position that is, in fact, the position held by the majority of
originalists — and that follows from the natural-law argument for originalism. The choice is not between applying
our understanding of an abstract principle or denying that the text embodies an abstract principle at all. Rather,
if we ought faithfully to obey the commands of those who ratified the text (and Vermeule appears to agree with
me that we should), then the correct approach is to determine, based on historical analysis, whether the people
understood the text to embody an abstract principle and, if so, what version of that principle the people
themselves understood the text to embody. Perhaps the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause was a term of art
that was not understood to embody an abstract principle, or perhaps it was understood to embody an abstract
principle, but the people understood it to embody a specific conception of that abstract principle that may differ
from our own, an interpretation supported by Professor John Stinneford’s exhaustive historical scholarship. As
Solum argues, only historical analysis can tell us for sure. McGinnis and Rappaport have made a similar
argument in responding to the work of Professor Jack Balkin, on which Vermeule also relies for his argument.
[xvii] Remarkably, even though Vermeule relies on Dworkin and Balkin for these points, his book never cites —
let alone addresses — the responses to Dworkin and Balkin offered by Solum, McGinnis, and Rappaport, which
predate Vermeule’s book by several years.
In any event, where historical analysis and the traditional principles of interpretation are unable to clarify underdeterminacy sufficiently to permit resolution of a specific constitutional dispute, it is simply not true that the only
remaining possibility — at least in the judicial context — is applying substantive moral principles. For example,
McGinnis — consistent with arguments made by Professors Gary Lawson and Michael Stokes Paulsen — has
made a compelling argument that, at the Founding, there was a “judicial obligation of clarity” that was “a
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constituent of judicial duty — and thus judicial power — ” and that “defined the standard by which judges
displaced applicable law with law of higher obligation.”[xviii] “Those who framed the Constitution and rendered
justice in the early Republic did understand judicial duty as requiring a clear incompatibility between the
Constitution and a statute before displacing the latter by the former.”[xix] If that is true, then the proper judicial
response in the face of under-determinacy that cannot be resolved through further historical analysis and
ordinary principles of interpretation would be to sustain the constitutionality of the statute, not to go beyond the
scope of the judicial power as originally understood by applying substantive moral principles.
McGinnis’s argument might or might not be sound; that is a historical question. But, again, the key point is that,
if one accepts my argument that the natural-law tradition requires us to adhere to the people’s understanding of
the scope of judicial power at the Founding, then we resolve under-determinacy in the judicial context primarily
through historical inquiry.
One final point. In the article, I draw out the implications of my argument for Vermeule’s theory in the context of
asking what a judge should do when the original meaning contradicts what the natural law might require in a
given instance. In his response, Vermeule asserts that this is “a sideshow” to the real issue of under-determinacy.
This is a strange response from Vermeule, given that he has explicitly, and at length, argued that “the critical
question” in assessing the relationship between originalism and the natural law is: “What happens if and when
the original understanding and the common good diverge?” I offer a response to that “critical question” that
differs from his.
***
Lawyer and blogger Pat Smith, who is supportive of Vermeule’s theory, has also responded to my article, and it is
worth replying to his critique because, whereas Vermeule and Casey find the arguments in my article
uncontroversial, Smith finds the arguments suffer from “serious problems.” The core of Smith’s objection is that
“there is no room in [Alicea’s] analysis for the people to express their reserved sovereignty through custom.” He
points out that Aquinas held, in line with other theorists, that “that the people have a reserved power to make,
abolish, and interpret law through custom,” and he asserts that “subsequent amendments, abolitions, and
interpretations via custom are the end of originalism.” Customary lawmaking, according to Smith, would allow
for something like Balkin’s theory, in which “the Constitution must be interpreted according to the people’s
changing understanding of the Constitution,” since these changing understandings could be seen as a
manifestation of the people’s lawmaking power through custom. Smith asserts that I “fail[] to engage with” the
issue of customary law.
I must say I find this critique odd. As Smith acknowledges, I cite Aquinas’s discussion of customary law in my
article, and precisely because the role of customary law could be thought to support a version of originalism like
Balkin’s, I — in Smith’s words — am “at pains to rebut Professor Jack Balkin.” So it is strange to say that the
article “fails to engage” with the question of customary law: that is why the section on Balkin is there, as Smith
himself seems to understand.
Smith’s real objection is that he does not agree with how I address the potential implications of the people’s
ability to make law through custom. In the natural-law tradition, the people are vested with at least two kinds of
political authority: the authority to constitute their government and the authority to govern day-to-day affairs.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/05/why-originalism-is-consistent-with-natural-law-a-reply-to-critics/

6/9

7/1/22, 1:27 PM

U.S. Constitution: Originalism Consistent with Natural Law | National Review

They transmit at least some of their day-to-day governing power to a government when they exercise their
constitution-making power, but they do not and cannot fully divest themselves of the authority to constitute the
regime, since (as I elaborate in the article, relying on Aquinas) they have ultimate responsibility for securing the
common good.
As relevant here, the issue of customary lawmaking comes in when we think about how the people manifest their
exercise of constitution-making authority. In Balkin’s theory, the people engage in an ongoing exercise of their
constitution-making authority through ordinary politics (e.g., elections), so the people can (in his view) also
legitimately change how the Constitution is understood through ordinary politics. A natural-law theorist could
argue (as I understand Smith to do) that Balkin is right to suppose that the people can manifest their
constitution-making power through ordinary politics, which is a reflection of their customary lawmaking
authority.
In the article, I argue that the problem with Balkin’s theory is that it effectively collapses the distinction between
ordinary politics (things like elections) and constitutional politics (the formal process of ratifying or amending
the Constitution). That matters because, in the context of the American constitutional system, the people made
the authoritative decision to separate ordinary from constitutional politics by including the Article V amendment
process in the Constitution. That separation was no accident. Rather, it was designed to better secure the
common good by (1) preventing sudden, unwise, and impassioned changes in the allocation of constitutional
authority through ordinary politics, which could undermine the common good, and (2) by allowing for genuine,
enforceable limits on governmental power by taking out of the hands of government officials the ability to
interpret ordinary elections as granting themselves additional power.
To accept Balkin’s (and Smith’s) argument, one would have to say that, post-1788, the people have overridden
Article V through instances of customary lawmaking manifested in ordinary politics. But that would mean
interpreting the people to have sub silentio worked a fundamental change in our regime, since (as just explained)
the separation of ordinary from higher politics is at the foundation of our Constitution. Indeed, as Marbury v.
Madison makes clear, it is the justification for judicial review: If the people may change the Constitution through
ordinary politics (such as the enactment of a statute), the judiciary would have no basis for setting aside a statute
that conflicts with the Constitution. Balkin’s argument conflicts with core aspects of our constitutional system,
which makes it an implausible interpretation of our regime. The better view — the view that accords with those
core aspects of our constitutional system — is that the people have authoritatively said that they will not manifest
their constitution-making power through custom; they will only do so through the Article V amendment process.
Of course, since the people retain ultimate constitution-making power, they could always abolish the Article V
amendment process and adopt a new constitution that permits them to exercise constitution-making authority
through custom. As I explicitly acknowledge in the article, nothing in the natural law forbids the people from
adopting such an arrangement. But it is not the arrangement that we have adopted in the United States. Aquinas
only addresses the abstract question of the people’s authority to make customary law; he does not purport to
analyze how that authority should be understood in the context of a specific constitutional order. Nothing that I
say, therefore, contradicts Aquinas on this point.
Smith’s error is that he analyzes the issue of customary lawmaking in the abstract, without reference to the
specifics of our regime. This is the same type of error Vermeule commits when he asserts that judges have the
power to apply substantive moral principles to resolve constitutional cases without taking into account the limits
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on judicial power that our regime imposes. Thus, like Vermeule, Smith’s argument must be that the natural law
requires that the people retain the ability to manifest their constitution-making power through custom and
forbids them to disclaim that ability in the context of a specific society. But as I point out in the article, there is
simply nothing in the natural-law tradition that requires that result, which would, in effect, be an argument that
Article V (and the separation of ordinary and constitutional politics on which our entire constitutional system is
based) is contrary to the natural law.
***
Perhaps Vermeule and Smith are of the view that the natural law does, in fact, forbid the constitutional
arrangements adopted by the people through the Constitution. Vermeule has said before, in passing, that “a
Constitution as morally compromised as our own” does not “always or even usually” “track the natural law,” so
perhaps he thinks the limitations on judicial power under Article III are one example of such moral
compromises. Perhaps Smith thinks the same of Article V. But neither has made an argument in that regard, and
if Article III and Article V are consistent with the natural law and are the result of the people’s exercise of
legitimate political authority, then the approach to constitutional adjudication that Vermeule advocates is
contrary to the natural-law tradition and would do great harm to the common good.
***
[i] Conor Casey and Adrian Vermeule, Argument By Slogan 17 (Apr. 27, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4081264.
[ii] Id. at 3.
[iii] I focus on Vermeule rather than Casey in this response because my article specifically takes on Vermeule’s
articulation of common-good constitutionalism and because Casey has yet to produce an extended treatment of
the theory like Vermeule’s book. In doing so, I do not mean to diminish Casey’s significant contributions to this
ongoing debate.
[iv] As I argue in my article, the limits on judicial authority under our Constitution are based on the natural law,
so in that sense, adherence to originalism is the result of applying substantive moral principles to our
constitutional system. But Vermeule would go further by, for example, interpreting the scope of Congress’s power
under the commerce clause based on the natural-law principle of subsidiarity, regardless of whether subsidiarity
was originally understood to have been incorporated into any source of positive law. See Adrian Vermeule,
Common Good Constitutionalism 162–64 (2022). This is the kind of application of moral principles that is in
dispute.
[v] Id. at 2.
[vi] Id. at 214 n.290
[vii] Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 110–11 (1999).
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[viii] Vermeule, supra, at 12; see also id. at 10, 43–47.
[ix] See Section III.B.
[x] Vermeule, supra, at 16; see also id. at 22, 83.
[xi] See pages 53–55 and notes 395–96 of the current draft of my article.
[xii] Vermeule, supra, at 52–90.
[xiii] Whether Harrison and Greene are correct in their interpretation of the equal protection clause and whether,
in light of more than a century of judicial precedent, courts ought to return to the original meaning of that clause
are separate questions that I do not address here.
[xiv] Id. at 95–96.
[xv] Id. at 95.
[xvi] Id. at 96–97.
[xvii] Id. at 97–99. It is also worth noting, as discussed below, that I devote an entire section of my article to
showing why Balkin’s theory is incompatible with the natural-law tradition as applied to American
constitutionalism, yet Vermeule—without responding to my arguments—states in his response that Balkin’s
theory “may fully satisfy Alicea’s axioms.”
[xviii] John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 843, 862 (2016).
[xix] Id. at 918.
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